By Adam Abass

In 2022, the Somali government and clan militias, supported by the United States and Türkiye drone strikes, launched a concerted military offensive against Al-Shabaab, leading to significant battlefield success and territorial gains. In the past few months, however, these military gains appear to have reversed, as the group has intensified its attacks on military outposts and civilian areas and mounted a campaign dubbed the “Shabelle offensive.”

The group’s offensive campaigns appear to mainly focus on the central region, as ACLED recorded a 50 per cent increase in attacks in the Hiran and middle Shabelle region. Correspondingly, concerns are growing as the group advances towards the capital. The group briefly seized towns 50km from the capital in March, attempted a failed assassination on the president, and most recently overran a strategic military base, also 245km from the capital, in Adan Yabaal, an area that serves as a staging ground for military operations against the group, although some reports indicated it has been recaptured. At the same time, the group has also conducted attacks on diplomatic compounds in the capital, as the group seeks to continue its efforts in consolidating power in the capital.

As the group continues its onslaught in the central region and the federal government continues to downplay the threat, it remains crucial that we investigate factors that have led to the regression of military gains and the way forward in the fight against the Al-Shabaab.

First, the political infighting and regional tension that have consumed the Somali government have, in many ways, contributed to these setbacks, resulting in a shifted focus away from the militant group.  The standoff with Ethiopia over the port access deal with Somaliland, along with crises involving the federal states of Puntland and Jubaland, with military force at the center, diverted military resources and operational capabilities towards internal disputes.

The Somalia-Ethiopia tension raged for over a year and nearly pushed both countries toward war, with Somalia willing to defend its sovereignty by force. Reports also indicated clashes between Ethiopian and Somali forces along the border during this period, before Türkiye brokered a deal between both countries. Similarly, federal states such as Puntland and Jubaland, whose cooperation is vital for the counteroffensive against the group, became embroiled in dispute with the federal government over electoral system reform.

This led to Jubaland and Puntland withdrawing from the federal system and severing ties with the federal government, undercutting the government’s offensive capabilities against Al-Shabaab in the central region. The political tension worsened when the Federal government of Somalia deployed security forces to Jubaland and launched a failed military assault to overthrow the regional president, further deepening divisions and diverting the underfunded and overstretched Somalia forces into internal political crisis and regional tension, a gap that Al-Shabaab militants largely exploited.

Secondly, the inability of the federal government to strengthen clan mobilisation and mediate inter-clan conflict has threatened the resolve of the counteroffensive. Clan militias’ partnership with the Somali security forces has been central to the territorial gain and success of the counter-offensive against the militants. However, by 2023 and continuing to date, clan militias’ involvement in the offensive has declined, as militias abandoned military bases citing a lack of trust from the government and fear of reprisals from Al-Shabaab.

Meanwhile, clan infighting has intensified over resource and territorial disputes, and perceived favouritism by the federal government towards certain clans has derailed the offensive and distracted militias from fighting Al-Shabaab. This has, in some cases, led to clans either aligning with Al-Shabaab or entering into a pact with the group. The surge in clan conflict has severely impacted the counter-offensive operation, as the Somali government had heavily relied on these clan militias to secure liberated areas and prevent Al-Shabaab’s re-infiltration.

Lastly, the AU peace mission dilemma. The AU forces have been effective in keeping the militant group at bay, supporting stabilisation and security sector reform efforts, and establishing a presence in the capital and other areas in the southern region. However, the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) mandate ended last year and was succeeded by the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). The operational effectiveness of the new mission has been hampered by limited funding and a lack of commitment from troops contributing countries.  

The new AU stabilisation mission is expected to be a cost-sharing process, with the UN covering 75 per cent of the funds and the AU responsible for the remainder. However, it has faced funding challenges, particularly due to the United States’ explicit refusal to provide financial support. This aligns with the broader trend under the Trump administration, which marked a retreat from multilateralism and included efforts to halt the US contribution to the UN peacekeeping mission.

On the other hand, troop deployment authorisation to the mission has encountered a rocky start. Some previous troops-contributing countries have either withdrawn their forces, as in the case of Burundi or failed to reach a new deployment agreement. However, there are signs of progress. The recent Kampal summit of troops contribution countries resulted in a pledge to deploy an additional 8,000 troops to support the mission, reportedly to be provided by Egypt. Nonetheless, the inability of the UN Security Council to reach a consensus on the funding mechanisms leaves the fate of the mission hanging in the balance.  

In conclusion, stemming the tide of Al-Shabaab’s advances will require urgent political will from the Somali government and its partners. Mogadishu must work to re-establish relations with the government in Jubaland and Puntland, especially as the latter has recently succeeded in its counterterrorism operations against the Islamic State in the region. The federal government must also regain the trust of clans and strengthen mediation efforts to resolve inter-clan conflict, preventing Al-Shabaab from exploiting internal schism. Lastly, Somalia must prepare an alternative funding plan to ensure the AU’s continued presence in the country, should the UN funding mechanism ultimately fail.