By Assam Francis

Since gaining political independence, many African countries have grappled with persistent challenges ranging from political instability, terrorism, and civil wars to economic underdevelopment. Despite being richly endowed with abundant natural resources and a vibrant youth population, the continent has often looked outward rather than inward for solutions, relying on loans, financial aid, and external interventions. Against this backdrop, the phrase ‘African solutions to African problems’ has been adopted as an official position in the African Union’s (AU) Agenda 2063 and has also emerged as a rallying cry in political speeches, academic debates, and diplomatic circles, urging Africans to take ownership of their destiny by seeking context-specific responses to their challenges.

But while the principle sounds empowering, its practical application is far more complex. Who defines what counts as an “African solution”? Do African leaders always have the political will to act in the best interests of their people? And can African institutions carry the weight of such a vision when they often depend on the very external actors they are supposed to replace? This article examines the promise of this idea and critically explores what can go wrong when noble slogans collide with political realities.

The Promise of African Solutions

The phrase “African solutions to African problems” was coined by the Ghanaian economist George Ayittey in response to the crisis in Somalia in the early 1990s. His argument at the time was that “outside attempts to resolve African problems have regularly proven ineffective and even counterproductive” and that any “long-term solution to problems can come only from Africans themselves.”

One of the strongest promises of this idea is ownership. When Africans take the lead in resolving their own crises, solutions are less likely to be imposed from the outside and more likely to carry legitimacy among local populations. This sense of ownership was evident in Kenya’s 2007–2008 post-election crisis, when mediation led by the African Union helped broker a peace agreement that ended weeks of violence which had claimed over 1,000 lives.

Another key advantage is reduced dependency on external actors such as the West, China, or the United Nations. For decades, Africa’s peace and development initiatives have been shaped by donors and outside powers, often with competing interests. African-led interventions, like the 2017 Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS) action in  Gambia that forced Yahya Jammeh to step down after refusing to accept election results, prove that regional bodies can act decisively without waiting for outside saviours.

African solutions are often more culturally relevant and context specific. External actors may overlook local customs, power dynamics, or traditional conflict resolution methods, while African mediators can draw from shared experiences and regional solidarity. In this sense, the slogan represents not just a political aspiration, but a practical path toward sustainable peace and self-determination. 

What Can Go Wrong?

The biggest stumbling block for “African solutions to African problems” is the absence of genuine political will. African leaders often undermine collective responses when these threaten their own authority. The African Union (AU), despite its role as a guardian of continental solidarity, has struggled to act against authoritarian regimes. Leaders like Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and Paul Biya of Cameroon have clung to power for decades with little pushback, while others in Rwanda, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo have altered constitutions to extend their rule. Such reluctance to confront one another shows how national interests frequently outweigh continental ideals.

Even when there is consensus, weak institutions limit the effectiveness of African-led interventions. The AU and regional blocs such as ECOWAS or IGAD often lack the resources and independence to implement decisions. According to AU reports, more than 60% of its peace and security budget has historically been financed by external donors, particularly the European Union. Such dependency erodes credibility and makes African-led missions vulnerable to shifting donor priorities, raising doubts about whether these solutions are truly self-determined.

Ironically, the principle also faces what can be called a dependency paradox. Even when interventions are led by Africans, they are still largely financed by external partners. A telling example is the AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM, later ATMIS), which relied almost entirely on funding from the EU and the United States. This external lifeline raises uncomfortable questions: how sustainable are African-led solutions if they cannot be executed without foreign money?

The continent’s own divisions complicate unity. Regional rivalries and mistrust have often derailed collective efforts. The recent decision by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger to withdraw from ECOWAS and form the Alliance of Sahel States underscores just how fragile solidarity can be. Without stronger cohesion, the slogan risks sounding more aspirational than actionable.

Balancing the Equation: Towards Practical African Solutions

For “African solutions to African problems” to live up to its promise, the continent must confront the gap between principle and practice. Strengthening institutions is the first step. Regional bodies like the AU and ECOWAS often produce well-crafted frameworks, such as the AU’s Peace and Security Architecture, but without effective enforcement, these remain paper tigers. Genuine accountability requires leaders to apply sanctions and intervene when peers manipulate constitutions or cling to power, rather than turning a blind eye.

Financial independence is equally crucial. As long as more than 60% of the AU’s peace and security budget comes from external donors, the claim of “self-reliance” rings hollow. African financial institutions, particularly the African Development Bank (AfDB), must take on a bigger role. In 2022 alone, the AfDB approved over $8 billion in loans and grants to African countries, proof that capacity exists if resources are mobilized effectively. Strengthening such institutions can ensure that African-led initiatives are not hostage to the whims of Brussels, Washington, or Beijing.

Equally important is industrialization. If Africa processes its raw materials locally, it will not only create jobs but also shift the continent from being a major consumer of processed goods to becoming a producer.

Finally, Africa does not need to choose between total independence and total dependence. A pragmatic balance, African leadership supported by selective, well-negotiated partnerships, offers a more realistic path. The principle itself is not flawed; the weakness lies in its execution.