By Francis Assam

The Alliance of Sahel States, a relatively new regional bloc comprised of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, has emerged as a significant player in Africa’s geopolitical landscape. Despite grappling with severe political instability, marked by military coups in each of these countries, the alliance faces an even greater threat: Jihadist group known as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Ansar al-Dine, both affiliated with Al-Qaeda, as well as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), a group linked with the Islamic State and Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). These non-state armed groups have further plunged the region into deeper chaos and underdevelopment, intensifying instability and delaying any prospects for progress.

Understanding Terrorist Groups in the Sahel

JNIM was officially formed in 2017 through a merger of preexisting militant groups, including al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magereb’s (AQIM) Sahara region. This group gained prominence by leveraging local grievances and discontent, which allowed them to recruit members, establish foot hold in cites primarily in Mali, including Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal. Meanwhile, ISGS emerged from the Islamic State’s efforts, declaring its establishment in 2015 as part of a broader campaign of the Islamic State in West Africa, with strong hold in Burkina Faso and Niger.

The activities of Jihadist groups in the Sahel have made them increasingly influential, drawing their funding from kidnaping for ransom, extortion, smuggling operations, cattle rustling and transnational network that support their operations in exchange for logistical assistance or ideological allegiance.

Terrorism in the Sahel makes up 38% of the world’s terrorism, which ranks the highest currently by any region. According to global conflict tracker, extremist violence in tri-state areas of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger has resulted in the deaths of 7,800 civilian, with over millions displaced in the first seven months of 2023, causing not only humanitarian crisis, but also high level of migration.

On September 5, 2023, Islamist militants killed seventeen soldiers and thirty-six volunteer fighters in northern Burkina Faso. Less than a month later, twenty-nine soldiers lost their lives in an attack by the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) in western Niger.

Most recently is an ambush in July 2024, led by Separatist Tuareg rebel group and JNIM, with backing from Kiev, that led to the death of some 47 Malian soldiers and 80 Russian Wagner mercenaries, according to Aljazeera.

The security and terrorism threat from jihadist and other local rebel group in the Sahel region has increased dramatically especially in the last three months, further undermining the military capability and alliance of these Sahel states to combat terrorism in their region.

Drivers of Terrorism

The Sahel has been an epicenter for political instability, with coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. The instability creates a vacuum that extremist groups such as JNIM and ISGS exploit, as they provide alternative forms of governance and security in areas where state control is absent or ineffective.

Many African countries bedeviled by terrorism have failed to address high levels of poverty, unemployment, and economic inequality. States in the Sahel are no different, as Jihadist groups have exploited these socio-economic gaps to bolster recruitment.

Local grievances between marginalized rebel groups and the government have been a key driver of terrorism in the Sahel. The conflict between the separatist Tuareg rebel group and the Malian government is a prime example. In July, this group collaborated with JNIM to launch an offensive against the Malian army and Russian mercenaries, further destabilizing the region.

Also, the spread of radical Islamist ideologies, often facilitated by external influences and local grievances, has contributed to the rise of jihadist movements in the Sahel. Groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS have established networks that promote violent extremism, appealing to individuals who feel marginalized or oppressed. The ideological framing of their struggles can resonate with local populations, making recruitment and collaboration easier.

Lastly, the conclusion of stabilization missions, such as the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and Operation Barkhane, has created a significant security vacuum across many Sahel states, allowing jihadist groups and smaller rebel factions time to regroup. With Russia also withdrawing over 100 Wagner mercenaries Burkina Faso, this might just create further security vacuum for this groups to exploit.

Effective Counter-terrorism methods

An effective counter-terrorism method in the Sahel will go beyond military action. A soft approach will have to be explored for the mitigation of terrorism in this region.

A key non-kinetic counter-terrorism approach is addressing the root causes of extremism. The Sahel, plagued by inequality and underdevelopment, is a prime target for jihadist recruitment. To combat this, the Alliance of Sahel States must prioritize investments in infrastructure, education, and job creation. While the Alliance may have limitations in funding such initiatives independently, it can play a crucial role in coordinating efforts and advocating for international support to address these underlying issues. These efforts are essential for reducing local vulnerabilities and dismantling the narratives that extremist groups exploit.

Even if the Alliance of Sahel States does not fully reintegrate with ECOWAS, it should seek alternative ways to strengthen regional collaboration with the bloc. Doing so would not only foster a more unified approach to counterterrorism but also promote broader regional growth and stability in the Sahel. Strengthened ties could facilitate joint initiatives in security, economic development, and governance, benefiting the entire region.

Stabilization missions such as MINUSMA and Operation Barkhane have played a crucial role in assisting Sahel states in recapturing key territories held by rebel and jihadist groups. While these external interventions have contributed to military gains, they have also faced challenges and limitations.

To build on these successes and address the shortcomings of past efforts, Sahel nations can seek further military assistance from international organizations, carefully considering the terms and conditions of such support. This external assistance can enhance military operations, improve intelligence sharing, and provide much-needed training to local forces, which is vital for sustaining momentum against extremist groups. However, it is essential to avoid overreliance on external forces and prioritize building the capacity of local militaries to ensure long-term sustainability and ownership of counter-terrorism efforts.

Additionally, strengthening international collaboration could help address the escalating humanitarian crisis in the region, which is projected to worsen if left unaddressed. By combining military efforts with humanitarian aid, these partnerships can alleviate the suffering of displaced populations and create more stable conditions, ultimately contributing to long-term peace and development in the Sahel.